# Socio-Linguistic Characteristics of Coordinated Inauthentic Accounts

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.11867 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.11867/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 19 May 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Emergent Coordinated Behaviors in Networked LLM Agents: Modeling the Strategic Dynamics of Information Operations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.25003/) (2025)
- [Estimating Causal Effects of Text Interventions Leveraging LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21474/) (2024)
- [Leveraging Machine Learning to Identify Gendered Stereotypes and Body Image Concerns on Diet and Fitness Online Forums](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.03551/) (2024)
- [Contagion Effect Estimation Using Proximal Embeddings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.02479/) (2023)
- [Large Language Models Reveal Information Operation Goals, Tactics, and Narrative Frames](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.03688/) (2024)
- [Posts of Peril: Detecting Information About Hazards in Text](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.17838/) (2024)
- [Multimodal Coordinated Online Behavior: Trade-offs and Strategies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.12108/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Online manipulation is a pressing concern for democracies, but the actions and strategies of coordinated inauthentic accounts, which have been used to interfere in elections, are not well understood. We analyze a five million-tweet multilingual dataset related to the 2017 French presidential election, when a major information campaign led by Russia called "#MacronLeaks" took place. We utilize heuristics to identify coordinated inauthentic accounts and detect attitudes, concerns and emotions within their tweets, collectively known as socio-linguistic characteristics. We find that coordinated accounts retweet other coordinated accounts far more than expected by chance, while being exceptionally active just before the second round of voting. Concurrently, socio-linguistic characteristics reveal that coordinated accounts share tweets promoting a candidate at three times the rate of non-coordinated accounts. Coordinated account tactics also varied in time to reflect news events and rounds of voting. Our analysis highlights the utility of socio-linguistic characteristics to inform researchers about tactics of coordinated accounts and how these may feed into online social manipulation.