# Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.11035 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.11035/

## Key facts

- Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 18 May 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Generative AI voting: fair collective choice is resilient to LLM biases and inconsistencies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11871/) (2024)
- [Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.15005/) (2024)
- [Bridging Voting and Deliberation with Algorithms: Field Insights from vTaiwan and Kultur Komitee](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.05017/) (2025)
- [Upgrading Democracies with Fairer Voting Methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14349/) (2025)
- [Consensus-based Participatory Budgeting for Legitimacy: Decision Support via Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.12915/) (2023)
- [Proportional Selection in Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.03545/) (2025)
- [Proportional Committee Elections with Positive and Negative Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.01985/) (2025)
- [Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst for Democratic Resilience: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguarding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.17461/) (2025)
- [LLMs for Resource Allocation: A Participatory Budgeting Approach to Inferring Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.06060/) (2025)
- [Algorithmic Shortlisting in Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.06577/) (2025)
- [Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.23097/) (2025)
- [A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.08504/) (2026)
- [Agreement, Diversity, and Polarization Indices for Approval Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14983/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We provide a library of participatory budgeting data (Pabulib) and open source tools (Pabutools and Pabustats) for analysing this data. We analyse how the results of participatory budgeting elections would change if a different selection rule was applied. We provide evidence that the outcomes of the Method of Equal Shares would be considerably fairer than those of the Utilitarian Greedy rule that is currently in use. We also show that the division of the projects into districts and/or categories can in many cases be avoided when using proportional rules. We find that this would increase the overall utility of the voters.