# Architecture-agnostic Iterative Black-box Certified Defense against Adversarial Patches

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10929 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10929/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 13 of its 20 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 18 May 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [An Image is Worth 16x16 Words: Transformers for Image Recognition at Scale](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.11929/) (2020)
- [On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.08347/) (2020)
- [Adversarial Patch](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.09665/) (2017)
- [DPatch: An Adversarial Patch Attack on Object Detectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.02299/) (2018)
- [LaVAN: Localized and Visible Adversarial Noise](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1801.02608/) (2018)
- [Certified Defenses for Adversarial Patches](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.06693/) (2020)
- [(De)Randomized Smoothing for Certifiable Defense against Patch Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.10733/) (2020)
- [Local Gradients Smoothing: Defense against localized adversarial attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.01216/) (2018)
- [PatchCleanser: Certifiably Robust Defense against Adversarial Patches for Any Image Classifier](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.09135/) (2021)
- [Certified Patch Robustness via Smoothed Vision Transformers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.07719/) (2021)
- [Towards Practical Certifiable Patch Defense with Vision Transformer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.08519/) (2022)
- [Efficient Certified Defenses Against Patch Attacks on Image Classifiers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.04154/) (2021)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Enhancing Object Detection Robustness: Detecting and Restoring Confidence in the Presence of Adversarial Patch Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.12988/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The adversarial patch attack aims to fool image classifiers within a bounded, contiguous region of arbitrary changes, posing a real threat to computer vision systems (e.g., autonomous driving, content moderation, biometric authentication, medical imaging) in the physical world. To address this problem in a trustworthy way, proposals have been made for certified patch defenses that ensure the robustness of classification models and prevent future patch attacks from breaching the defense. State-of-the-art certified defenses can be compatible with any model architecture, as well as achieve high clean and certified accuracy. Although the methods are adaptive to arbitrary patch positions, they inevitably need to access the size of the adversarial patch, which is unreasonable and impractical in real-world attack scenarios. To improve the feasibility of the architecture-agnostic certified defense in a black-box setting (i.e., position and size of the patch are both unknown), we propose a novel two-stage Iterative Black-box Certified Defense method, termed IBCD.In the first stage, it estimates the patch size in a search-based manner by evaluating the size relationship between the patch and mask with pixel masking. In the second stage, the accuracy results are calculated by the existing white-box certified defense methods with the estimated patch size. The experiments conducted on two popular model architectures and two datasets verify the effectiveness and efficiency of IBCD.