# Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.09780 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.09780/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 16 May 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Drawing a Map of Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.03809/) (2025)
- [Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.12927/) (2024)
- [Diversity of Structured Domains via k-Kemeny Scores](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.15812/) (2025)
- [Outer Diversity of Structured Domains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15708/) (2026)
- [Selecting the Most Conflicting Pair of Candidates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.05870/) (2024)
- [Independence of Approximate Clones](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.20779/) (2026)
- [Agreement, Diversity, and Polarization Indices for Approval Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14983/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such measures for the other two notions are lacking. We attempt to rectify this issue by designing appropriate measures, providing means of their (approximate) computation, and arguing that they, indeed, capture diversity and polarization well. In particular, we present "maps of preference orders" that highlight relations between the votes in a given election and which help in making arguments about their nature.