# Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.00843 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.00843/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 19 of its 51 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 1 May 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 19 of 19)

- [Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.08713/) (2018)
- [Schelling Games on Graphs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.07937/) (2019)
- [Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.07513/) (2019)
- [Individual-Based Stability in Hedonic Diversity Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.08669/) (2019)
- [Two-Stage Facility Location Games with Strategic Clients and Facilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.01425/) (2021)
- [Tolerance is Necessary for Stability: Single-Peaked Swap Schelling Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.12599/) (2022)
- [Hedonic Diversity Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.00303/) (2019)
- [Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.02752/) (2020)
- [Modified Schelling Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.12149/) (2020)
- [Hedonic Diversity Games: A Complexity Picture with More than Two Colors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.09210/) (2022)
- [Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.02086/) (2020)
- [Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.02699/) (2021)
- [Strategic Facility Location with Clients that Minimize Total Waiting Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.14016/) (2022)
- [Group Activity Selection Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1401.8151/) (2014)
- [Network Creation with Homophilic Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.13757/) (2022)
- [Group Activity Selection on Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.04524/) (2016)
- [Group Activity Selection on Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.02712/) (2017)
- [Hedonic Expertise Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.01778/) (2020)
- [Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12107/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03114/) (2024)
- [The Bakers and Millers Game with Restricted Locations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.05334/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then depends on the number of agents using the same resources. This implies that there is no distinction between the agents, i.e., they are anonymous. We depart from this very general setting by proposing Resource Selection Games with heterogeneous agents that strive for joint resource usage with similar agents. So, instead of the number of other users of a given resource, our model considers agents with different types and the decisive feature is the fraction of same-type agents among the users. More precisely, similarly to Schelling Games, there is a tolerance threshold τ ∈ [0,1] which specifies the agents' desired minimum fraction of same-type agents on a resource. Agents strive to select resources where at least a τ-fraction of those resources' users have the same type as themselves. For τ=1, our model generalizes Hedonic Diversity Games with a peak at 1. For our general model, we consider the existence and quality of equilibria and the complexity of maximizing social welfare. Additionally, we consider a bounded rationality model, where agents can only estimate the utility of a resource, since they only know the fraction of same-type agents on a given resource, but not the exact numbers. Thus, they cannot know the impact a strategy change would have on a target resource. Interestingly, we show that this type of bounded rationality yields favorable game-theoretic properties and specific equilibria closely approximate equilibria of the full knowledge setting.