# Nuclear Arms Control Verification and Lessons for AI Treaties

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.04123 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.04123/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 Apr 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Verification methods for international AI agreements](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.16074/) (2024)
- [International Governance of Civilian AI: A Jurisdictional Certification Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.15514/) (2023)
- [Trends in AI Supercomputers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.16026/) (2025)
- [Taking control: Policies to address extinction risks from advanced AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.20563/) (2023)
- [Multinational AGI Consortium (MAGIC): A Proposal for International Coordination on AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.09217/) (2023)
- [International Agreements to Limit Frontier AI: Objectives and Exit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.16224/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Security risks from AI have motivated calls for international agreements that guardrail the technology. However, even if states could agree on what rules to set on AI, the problem of verifying compliance might make these agreements infeasible. To help clarify the difficulty of verifying agreements on AIunicodex2013and identify actions that might reduce this difficultyunicodex2013this report examines the case study of verification in nuclear arms control. We review the implementation, track records, and politics of verification across three types of nuclear arms control agreements. Then, we consider implications for the case of AI, especially AI development that relies on thousands of highly specialized chips. In this context, the case study suggests that, with certain preparations, the foreseeable challenges of verification would be reduced to levels that were successfully managed in nuclear arms control. To avoid even worse challenges, substantial preparations are needed: (1) developing privacy-preserving, secure, and acceptably priced methods for verifying the compliance of hardware, given inspection access; and (2) building an initial, incomplete verification system, with authorities and precedents that allow its gaps to be quickly closed if and when the political will arises.