# Rule Enforcing Through Ordering

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.17971 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.17971/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 5 of its 9 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 31 Mar 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1707.06347/) (2017)
- [Emergent Tool Use From Multi-Agent Autocurricula](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.07528/) (2019)
- [A Unified Game-Theoretic Approach to Multiagent Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.00832/) (2017)
- [An operator view of policy gradient methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.11266/) (2020)
- [Tight Lower Bound on the Probability of a Binomial Exceeding its Expectation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1306.1433/) (2013)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In many real world situations, like minor traffic offenses in big cities, a central authority is tasked with periodic administering punishments to a large number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller fine and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the individual risk is typically small and a rational individual will not choose to pay the fine. Here we show that if the central authority processes the offenders in a publicly known order, it properly incentives the offenders to pay the fine. We show analytically and on realistic experiments that our mechanism promotes non-cooperation and incentives individuals to pay. Moreover, the same holds for an arbitrary coalition. We quantify the expected total payment the central authority receives, and show it increases considerably.