# Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.14454 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.14454/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 25 Mar 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14593/) (2024)
- [Online Fair Division with Additional Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.24503/) (2025)
- [The Coordination Gap: Multi-Agent Alternation Metrics for Temporal Fairness in Repeated Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.05789/) (2026)
- [Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.26410/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is resource-, population-, and weight-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time. We generalize these results to the class of weighted additive welfarist rules with concave functions and agents with matroid-rank (also known as binary submodular) valuations.