# DRSM: De-Randomized Smoothing on Malware Classifier Providing Certified Robustness

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13372 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.13372/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 16 of its 32 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 Mar 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 16 of 16)

- [Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6572/) (2014)
- [Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.02918/) (2019)
- [Certified Robustness to Adversarial Examples with Differential Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.03471/) (2018)
- [Provably Robust Deep Learning via Adversarially Trained Smoothed Classifiers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.04584/) (2019)
- [EMBER: An Open Dataset for Training Static PE Malware Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.04637/) (2018)
- [Malware Detection by Eating a Whole EXE](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.09435/) (2017)
- [(De)Randomized Smoothing for Certifiable Defense against Patch Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.10733/) (2020)
- [Adversarial Malware Binaries: Evading Deep Learning for Malware Detection in Executables](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.04173/) (2018)
- [Robustness Certificates for Sparse Adversarial Attacks by Randomized Ablation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.09272/) (2019)
- [Functionality-preserving Black-box Optimization of Adversarial Windows Malware](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.13526/) (2020)
- [Transcending Transcend: Revisiting Malware Classification in the Presence of Concept Drift](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.03856/) (2020)
- [Exploring Adversarial Examples in Malware Detection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.08280/) (2018)
- [Explaining Vulnerabilities of Deep Learning to Adversarial Malware Binaries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1901.03583/) (2019)
- [Malware Makeover: Breaking ML-based Static Analysis by Modifying Executable Bytes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.09064/) (2019)
- [Deceiving End-to-End Deep Learning Malware Detectors using Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.04528/) (2018)
- [Non-Negative Networks Against Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.06108/) (2018)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [LipNeXt: Scaling up Lipschitz-based Certified Robustness to Billion-parameter Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.18513/) (2026)
- [Certified Adversarial Robustness of Machine Learning-based Malware Detectors via (De)Randomized Smoothing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.00392/) (2024)
- [EXE-Bench: Ranking the Tradeoffs of AI-based Windows Malware Detectors for Real-World Usability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.24177/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Machine Learning (ML) models have been utilized for malware detection for over two decades. Consequently, this ignited an ongoing arms race between malware authors and antivirus systems, compelling researchers to propose defenses for malware-detection models against evasion attacks. However, most if not all existing defenses against evasion attacks suffer from sizable performance degradation and/or can defend against only specific attacks, which makes them less practical in real-world settings. In this work, we develop a certified defense, DRSM (De-Randomized Smoothed MalConv), by redesigning the de-randomized smoothing technique for the domain of malware detection. Specifically, we propose a window ablation scheme to provably limit the impact of adversarial bytes while maximally preserving local structures of the executables. After showing how DRSM is theoretically robust against attacks with contiguous adversarial bytes, we verify its performance and certified robustness experimentally, where we observe only marginal accuracy drops as the cost of robustness. To our knowledge, we are the first to offer certified robustness in the realm of static detection of malware executables. More surprisingly, through evaluating DRSM against 9 empirical attacks of different types, we observe that the proposed defense is empirically robust to some extent against a diverse set of attacks, some of which even fall out of the scope of its original threat model. In addition, we collected 15.5K recent benign raw executables from diverse sources, which will be made public as a dataset called PACE (Publicly Accessible Collection(s) of Executables) to alleviate the scarcity of publicly available benign datasets for studying malware detection and provide future research with more representative data of the time.