# Externalities in Chore Division

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.12446 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.12446/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 9 of its 41 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Mar 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1604.03655/) (2016)
- [Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.01766/) (2019)
- [The Query Complexity of Cake Cutting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.02946/) (2017)
- [On the Complexity of Chore Division](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.00271/) (2017)
- [Fair and Efficient Cake Division with Connected Pieces](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.11019/) (2019)
- [Dividing Bads is Harder than Dividing Goods: On the Complexity of Fair and Efficient Division of Chores](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.00285/) (2020)
- [Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.09066/) (2021)
- [Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items With Externalities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.06191/) (2018)
- [Fair Allocation with Special Externalities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.12806/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally appear in fair division situations. We first demonstrate the generalization of the classical concepts of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the classical model by taking externalities into account.