# A Myersonian Framework for Optimal Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.00208 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.00208/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 1 Mar 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.07428/) (2024)
- [Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.09129/) (2024)
- [ZeroSwap: Data-driven Optimal Market Making in DeFi](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.09413/) (2023)
- [RAmmStein: Regime Adaptation in Mean-reverting Markets with Stein Thresholds -- Optimal Impulse Control in Concentrated AMMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.19419/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited by liquidity providers (LPs). The goal of this paper is to characterize and interpret the optimal (i.e., profit-maximizing) strategy of a monopolist liquidity provider, as a function of that LP's beliefs about asset prices and trader behavior. We introduce a general framework for reasoning about AMMs based on a Bayesian-like belief inference framework, where LPs maintain an asset price estimate. In this model, the market maker (i.e., LP) chooses a demand curve that specifies the quantity of a risky asset to be held at each dollar price. Traders arrive sequentially and submit a price bid that can be interpreted as their estimate of the risky asset price; the AMM responds to this submitted bid with an allocation of the risky asset to the trader, a payment that the trader must pay, and a revised internal estimate for the true asset price. We define an incentive-compatible (IC) AMM as one in which a trader's optimal strategy is to submit its true estimate of the asset price, and characterize the IC AMMs as those with downward-sloping demand curves and payments defined by a formula familiar from Myerson's optimal auction theory. We generalize Myerson's virtual values, and characterize the profit-maximizing IC AMM. The optimal demand curve generally has a jump that can be interpreted as a "bid-ask spread," which we show is caused by a combination of adverse selection risk (dominant when the degree of information asymmetry is large) and monopoly pricing (dominant when asymmetry is small). This work opens up new research directions into the study of automated exchange mechanisms from the lens of optimal auction theory and iterative belief inference, using tools of theoretical computer science in a novel way.