# Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.09168 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.09168/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 17 Feb 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Performance Manipulation: Labor Market Implications in AI-assisted Era](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.22230/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a broad class of agent preferences, we show that coordination mechanisms (where recommended signals depend on joint reports) can be outperformed by non-coordination mechanisms (where signals depend solely on individual reports). We formalize the conditions under which the optimal mechanism features no coordination and demonstrate that such mechanisms are implementable through coarse-ranking contests.