# Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information Asymmetry

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.11446 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.11446/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 9 of its 33 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Dec 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [The Confluence of Networks, Games and Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.08158/) (2021)
- [Approachability, Regret and Calibration; implications and equivalences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1301.2663/) (2013)
- [Blackwell Online Learning for Markov Decision Processes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.14043/) (2020)
- [Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.06566/) (2020)
- [On Stackelberg Mixed Strategies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07476/) (2017)
- [Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.02917/) (2019)
- [Manipulating a Learning Defender and Ways to Counteract](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.11759/) (2019)
- [On the Resilience of Traffic Networks under Non-Equilibrium Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03214/) (2022)
- [Distributed Machine Learning with Strategic Network Design: A Game-Theoretic Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.01455/) (2020)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [The Game-Theoretic Symbiosis of Trust and AI in Networked Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.12859/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian Stackelberg game, where the leader's realized action, sampled from the mixed strategy commitment, is hidden from the follower. In contrast, the follower holds private information about his payoff. Given asymmetric information on both sides, an important question arises: Does the leader's information advantage outweigh the follower's? We answer this question affirmatively in this work, where we demonstrate that by adequately designing a signaling device that reveals partial information regarding the leader's realized action to the follower, the leader can achieve a higher expected utility than that without signaling. Moreover, unlike previous works on the Bayesian Stackelberg game where mathematical programming tools are utilized, we interpret the leader's commitment as a probability measure over the belief space. Such a probabilistic language greatly simplifies the analysis and allows an indirect signaling scheme, leading to a geometric characterization of the equilibrium under the proposed game model.