# Correlated equilibria for mean field games with progressive strategies

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.01656 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.01656/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Dec 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Major-Minor Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.10665/) (2023)
- [The Learning Approach to Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.00227/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In a discrete space and time framework, we study the mean field game limit for a class of symmetric N-player games based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We give a definition of correlated solution that allows to construct approximate N-player correlated equilibria that are robust with respect to progressive deviations. We illustrate our definition by way of an example with explicit solutions.