# Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition Formation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.17169 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.17169/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 30 Nov 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Intelligent AI Delegation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.11865/) (2026)
- [A Task-Driven Multi-UAV Coalition Formation Mechanism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05108/) (2024)
- [Offline Learning of Nash Stable Coalition Structures with Possibly Overlapping Coalitions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.14321/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where members of a coalition decrease their utility for a leaving agent (resent) or increase their utility for a joining agent (appreciation). We show that in contrast to classical dynamics, for resentful or appreciative agents, dynamics are guaranteed to converge under mild conditions for various stability concepts. Thereby, we establish that both resent and appreciation are strong stability-driving forces.