# Obvious Independence of Clones

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04880 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.04880/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 10 Oct 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Clone-Robust AI Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.09254/) (2025)
- [AI Alignment From Social Choice Perspectives](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.21550/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The Independence of Clones (IoC) criterion measures a voting rule's robustness to strategic nomination. Prior literature has established empirically that individuals may still submit costly, distortionary misreports even in strategy-proof (SP) settings, due to failure to recognize the SP property. The intersection of these issues motivates the search for mechanisms that are Obviously Independent of Clones (OIoC): where strategic nomination/exiting of clones obviously has no effect on the outcome. We construct a formal and intuitive definition of a voting rule being OIoC and examine five IoC rules to identify whether they satisfy OIoC.