# Privacy Attacks Against Biometric Models with Fewer Samples: Incorporating the Output of Multiple Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.11020 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.11020/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Membership inference attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 27 of its 68 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Sep 2022.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Membership inference attacks](https://mlsanity.com/safety/membership-inference-attacks/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 27 of 27)

- [Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6980/) (2014)
- [Densely Connected Convolutional Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.06993/) (2016)
- [Perceptual Losses for Real-Time Style Transfer and Super-Resolution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1603.08155/) (2016)
- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [Machine Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.03817/) (2019)
- [CosFace: Large Margin Cosine Loss for Deep Face Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1801.09414/) (2018)
- [Towards Federated Learning at Scale: System Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.01046/) (2019)
- [SphereFace: Deep Hypersphere Embedding for Face Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.08063/) (2017)
- [Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.02943/) (2016)
- [Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.04049/) (2018)
- [ML-Leaks: Model and Data Independent Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.01246/) (2018)
- [Making AI Forget You: Data Deletion in Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.05012/) (2019)
- [Knockoff Nets: Stealing Functionality of Black-Box Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.02766/) (2018)
- [The Secret Revealer: Generative Model-Inversion Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.07135/) (2019)
- [Stolen Memories: Leveraging Model Memorization for Calibrated White-Box Membership Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.11798/) (2019)
- [Updates-Leak: Data Set Inference and Reconstruction Attacks in Online Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1904.01067/) (2019)
- [Stealing Hyperparameters in Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.05351/) (2018)
- [On the Reconstruction of Face Images from Deep Face Templates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.00832/) (2017)
- [Model-Reuse Attacks on Deep Learning Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.00483/) (2018)
- [DeepSecure: Scalable Provably-Secure Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.08963/) (2017)
- [Ranking Based Locality Sensitive Hashing Enabled Cancelable Biometrics: Index-of-Max Hashing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.05455/) (2017)
- [Deep Learning-Based Feature Extraction in Iris Recognition: Use Existing Models, Fine-tune or Train From Scratch?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.08916/) (2020)
- [ThirdEye: Triplet Based Iris Recognition without Normalization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.06147/) (2019)
- [The ND-IRIS-0405 Iris Image Dataset](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.04853/) (2016)
- [Resist : Reconstruction of irises from templates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.15850/) (2020)
- [Fuzzy Commitments Offer Insufficient Protection to Biometric Templates Produced by Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.13293/) (2020)
- [Unconstrained Iris Segmentation using Convolutional Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.08245/) (2018)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Authentication systems are vulnerable to model inversion attacks where an adversary is able to approximate the inverse of a target machine learning model. Biometric models are a prime candidate for this type of attack. This is because inverting a biometric model allows the attacker to produce a realistic biometric input to spoof biometric authentication systems. One of the main constraints in conducting a successful model inversion attack is the amount of training data required. In this work, we focus on iris and facial biometric systems and propose a new technique that drastically reduces the amount of training data necessary. By leveraging the output of multiple models, we are able to conduct model inversion attacks with 1/10th the training set size of Ahmad and Fuller (IJCB 2020) for iris data and 1/1000th the training set size of Mai et al. (Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 2019) for facial data. We denote our new attack technique as structured random with alignment loss. Our attacks are black-box, requiring no knowledge of the weights of the target neural network, only the dimension, and values of the output vector. To show the versatility of the alignment loss, we apply our attack framework to the task of membership inference (Shokri et al., IEEE S&P 2017) on biometric data. For the iris, membership inference attack against classification networks improves from 52% to 62% accuracy.
