# How to cut a discrete cake fairly

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.01348 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.01348/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Sep 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [PPAD-Completeness of Contiguous Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Additive Valuations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.19690/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Cake-cutting is a fundamental model of dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as land, broadcast time, and advertisement space. In this study, we consider the problem of dividing a discrete cake fairly in which the indivisible goods are aligned on a path and agents are interested in receiving a connected subset of items. We prove that a connected division of indivisible items satisfying a discrete counterpart of envy-freeness, called envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), always exists for any number of agents n with monotone valuations. Our result settles an open question raised by Bil`o et al. (2019), who proved that an EF1 connected division always exists for the number of agents at most 4. Moreover, the proof can be extended to show the following (1) secretive and (2) extra versions: (1) for n agents with monotone valuations, the path can be divided into n connected bundles such that an EF1 assignment of the remaining bundles can be made to the other agents for any selection made by the secretive agent; (2) for n+1 agents with monotone valuations, the path can be divided into n connected bundles such that when any extra agent leaves, an EF1 assignment of the bundles can be made to the remaining agents.