# On Shapley Value in Data Assemblage Under Independent Utility

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.01163 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.01163/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 1 Aug 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [On the Inflation of KNN-Shapley Value](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.17489/) (2024)
- [Local Shapley: Model-Induced Locality and Optimal Reuse in Data Valuation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.03672/) (2026)
- [Data Overvaluation Attack and Truthful Data Valuation in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.00494/) (2025)
- [Validation-Induced Shapley Shifts: How Validation Structure Distorts Data Valuation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.03675/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In many applications, an organization may want to acquire data from many data owners. Data marketplaces allow data owners to produce data assemblage needed by data buyers through coalition. To encourage coalitions to produce data, it is critical to allocate revenue to data owners in a fair manner according to their contributions. Although in literature Shapley fairness and alternatives have been well explored to facilitate revenue allocation in data assemblage, computing exact Shapley value for many data owners and large assembled data sets through coalition remains challenging due to the combinatoric nature of Shapley value. In this paper, we explore the decomposability of utility in data assemblage by formulating the independent utility assumption. We argue that independent utility enjoys many applications. Moreover, we identify interesting properties of independent utility and develop fast computation techniques for exact Shapley value under independent utility. Our experimental results on a series of benchmark data sets show that our new approach not only guarantees the exactness of Shapley value, but also achieves faster computation by orders of magnitudes.