# Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.07981 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07981/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 14 of its 42 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 16 Jul 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 14 of 14)

- [Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.13276/) (2020)
- [Participatory Budgeting: Models and Approaches](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.00606/) (2020)
- [Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1506.02891/) (2015)
- [On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1402.0580/) (2014)
- [Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.02542/) (2017)
- [Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.06856/) (2020)
- [Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.00457/) (2019)
- [Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.08226/) (2017)
- [Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.00864/) (2019)
- [A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.04382/) (2018)
- [Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.02453/) (2017)
- [Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1604.01529/) (2016)
- [Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: a Probabilistic Social Choice Function](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.00544/) (2017)
- [Participatory Budgeting with Project Groups](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.05213/) (2020)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Participatory Budgeting With Multiple Degrees of Projects And Ranged Approval Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10972/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Participatory budgeting (PB) has attracted much attention in recent times due to its wide applicability in social choice settings. In this paper, we consider indivisible PB which involves allocating an available, limited budget to a set of indivisible projects, each having a certain cost, based on the preferences of agents over projects. The specific, important, research gap that we address in this paper is to propose classes of rules for indivisible PB with weak rankings (i.e., weak ordinal preferences) and investigate their key algorithmic and axiomatic issues. We propose two classes of rules having distinct significance and motivation. The first is layered approval rules which enable weak rankings to be studied by carefully translating them into approval votes. The second is need-based rules which enable to capture fairness issues. Under layered approval rules, we study two natural families of rules: greedy-truncation rules and cost-worthy rules. The paper has two parts. In the first part, we investigate algorithmic and complexity related issues for the proposed rules. In the second part, we present a detailed axiomatic analysis of these rules, for which, we examine and generalize axioms in the literature and also introduce a new axiom, pro-affordability. The paper helps to highlight the trade-offs among practical appeal, computational complexity, and axiomatic compliance of these rules.