# Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.04983 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.04983/

## Key facts

- Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 11 Jul 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.13637/) (2024)
- [Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14593/) (2024)
- [Strengthening Proportionality in Temporal Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22513/) (2025)
- [Online Fair Division with Additional Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.24503/) (2025)
- [Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.08810/) (2025)
- [Approximate Proportionality in Online Fair Division](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.03253/) (2025)
- [The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.11157/) (2026)
- [Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.04624/) (2025)
- [Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.23310/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be confused about some of the issues, in which case they may vote for the option that is objectively worse for them. A benevolent external party wants to help the agents to make better decisions, i.e., select the majority-preferred option for as many issues as possible. This party may have one of the following tools at its disposal: (1) educating some of the agents, so as to enable them to vote correctly on all issues, (2) appointing a subset of highly competent agents to make decisions on behalf of the entire group, or (3) guiding the agents on how to delegate their votes to other agents, in a way that is consistent with the agents' opinions. For each of these tools, we study the complexity of the decision problem faced by this external party, obtaining both NP-hardness results and fixed-parameter tractability results.