# First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.01761 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.01761/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 5 Jul 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Learning to Bid in Non-Stationary Repeated First-Price Auctions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.13358/) (2025)
- [Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.01852/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We prove that the sf PoA of sf First Price Auctions is 1 - 1/e2 ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430,, 0.8689].