# Differentially Private Condorcet Voting

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13081 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.13081/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 7 of its 31 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 27 Jun 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Private Matchings and Allocations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1311.2828/) (2013)
- [Neutralizing Self-Selection Bias in Sampling for Sortition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.10498/) (2020)
- [The Application of Differential Privacy for Rank Aggregation: Privacy and Accuracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.6831/) (2014)
- [Private Rank Aggregation under Local Differential Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.04486/) (2019)
- [Privacy and Mechanism Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1306.2083/) (2013)
- [Private Pareto Optimal Exchange](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1407.2641/) (2014)
- [Welfare Maximization Entices Participation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1508.03538/) (2015)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Score Attack: A Lower Bound Technique for Optimal Differentially Private Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.07152/) (2023)
- [Ranking Differential Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.00841/) (2023)
- [No Agreement Without Loss: Learning and Social Choice in Peer Review](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.02144/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known Condorcet method, and focus on three classes of voting rules in this family: Laplacian Condorcet method (CMLAPλ), exponential Condorcet method (CMEXPλ), and randomized response Condorcet method (CMRRλ), where λ represents the level of noise. We prove that all of our rules satisfy absolute monotonicity, lexi-participation, probabilistic Pareto efficiency, approximate probabilistic Condorcet criterion, and approximate SD-strategyproofness. In addition, CMRRλ satisfies (non-approximate) probabilistic Condorcet criterion, while CMLAPλ and CMEXPλ satisfy strong lexi-participation. Finally, we regard differential privacy as a voting axiom, and discuss its relations to other axioms.