# Adversarial Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface Against Physical Layer Key Generation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.10955 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.10955/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 Jun 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Explainable Adversarial Learning Framework on Physical Layer Secret Keys Combating Malicious Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.06663/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The development of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) has recently advanced the research of physical layer security (PLS). Beneficial impacts of RIS include but are not limited to offering a new degree-of-freedom (DoF) for key-less PLS optimization, and increasing channel randomness for physical layer secret key generation (PL-SKG). However, there is a lack of research studying how adversarial RIS can be used to attack and obtain legitimate secret keys generated by PL-SKG. In this work, we show an Eve-controlled adversarial RIS (Eve-RIS), by inserting into the legitimate channel a random and reciprocal channel, can partially reconstruct the secret keys from the legitimate PL-SKG process. To operationalize this concept, we design Eve-RIS schemes against two PL-SKG techniques used: (i) the CSI-based PL-SKG, and (ii) the two-way cross multiplication based PL-SKG. The channel probing at Eve-RIS is realized by compressed sensing designs with a small number of radio-frequency (RF) chains. Then, the optimal RIS phase is obtained by maximizing the Eve-RIS inserted deceiving channel. Our analysis and results show that even with a passive RIS, our proposed Eve-RIS can achieve a high key match rate with legitimate users, and is resistant to most of the current defensive approaches. This means the novel Eve-RIS provides a new eavesdropping threat on PL-SKG, which can spur new research areas to counter adversarial RIS attacks.