# l-Leaks: Membership Inference Attacks with Logits

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.06469 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.06469/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Membership inference attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 22 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 May 2022.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Membership inference attacks](https://mlsanity.com/safety/membership-inference-attacks/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 22 of 22)

- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [The Secret Sharer: Evaluating and Testing Unintended Memorization in Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.08232/) (2018)
- [Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.04049/) (2018)
- [ML-Leaks: Model and Data Independent Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.01246/) (2018)
- [Label-Only Membership Inference Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.14321/) (2020)
- [Systematic Evaluation of Privacy Risks of Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.10595/) (2020)
- [Adversary Instantiation: Lower Bounds for Differentially Private Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.04535/) (2021)
- [When Machine Unlearning Jeopardizes Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.02205/) (2020)
- [Machine Learning with Membership Privacy using Adversarial Regularization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.05852/) (2018)
- [Stolen Memories: Leveraging Model Memorization for Calibrated White-Box Membership Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.11798/) (2019)
- [Membership Leakage in Label-Only Exposures](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.15528/) (2020)
- [Updates-Leak: Data Set Inference and Reconstruction Attacks in Online Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1904.01067/) (2019)
- [Reconstruction and Membership Inference Attacks against Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.03006/) (2019)
- [Stealing Links from Graph Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.02131/) (2020)
- [Understanding Membership Inferences on Well-Generalized Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.04889/) (2018)
- [Practical Blind Membership Inference Attack via Differential Comparisons](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.01341/) (2021)
- [EncoderMI: Membership Inference against Pre-trained Encoders in Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.11023/) (2021)
- [Segmentations-Leak: Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses in Semantic Image Segmentation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.09685/) (2019)
- [Performing Co-Membership Attacks Against Deep Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.09898/) (2018)
- [The Audio Auditor: User-Level Membership Inference in Internet of Things Voice Services](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.07082/) (2019)
- [Sampling Attacks: Amplification of Membership Inference Attacks by Repeated Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.00395/) (2020)
- [Characterizing Membership Privacy in Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.02249/) (2019)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [SoK: Comparing Different Membership Inference Attacks with a Comprehensive Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.06123/) (2023)
- [When Better Features Mean Greater Risks: The Performance-Privacy Trade-Off in Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.05743/) (2025)
- [Online Gradient Boosting Decision Tree: In-Place Updates for Efficient Adding/Deleting Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.01634/) (2025)
- [Improving Unlearning with Model Updates Probably Aligned with Gradients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.02435/) (2025)
- [Calibrating One-Round Membership Inference with Neighbors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.36331/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Machine Learning (ML) has made unprecedented progress in the past several decades. However, due to the memorability of the training data, ML is susceptible to various attacks, especially Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs), the objective of which is to infer the model's training data. So far, most of the membership inference attacks against ML classifiers leverage the shadow model with the same structure as the target model. However, empirical results show that these attacks can be easily mitigated if the shadow model is not clear about the network structure of the target model. In this paper, We present attacks based on black-box access to the target model. We name our attack l-Leaks. The l-Leaks follows the intuition that if an established shadow model is similar enough to the target model, then the adversary can leverage the shadow model's information to predict a target sample's membership.The logits of the trained target model contain valuable sample knowledge. We build the shadow model by learning the logits of the target model and making the shadow model more similar to the target model. Then shadow model will have sufficient confidence in the member samples of the target model. We also discuss the effect of the shadow model's different network structures to attack results. Experiments over different networks and datasets demonstrate that both of our attacks achieve strong performance.
