# SoK: Rethinking Sensor Spoofing Attacks against Robotic Vehicles from a Systematic View

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.04662 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.04662/

## Key facts

- Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 10 May 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [Towards Robust and Secure Embodied AI: A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.13175/) (2025)
- [SafeEmbodAI: a Safety Framework for Mobile Robots in Embodied AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.01630/) (2024)
- [Security Considerations in AI-Robotics: A Survey of Current Methods, Challenges, and Opportunities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08565/) (2023)
- [AdvGPS: Adversarial GPS for Multi-Agent Perception Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.17499/) (2024)
- [Detection and Recovery of Adversarial Slow-Pose Drift in Offloaded Visual-Inertial Odometry](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.07130/) (2025)
- [Angel or Demon: Investigating the Plasticity Interventions' Impact on Backdoor Threats in Deep Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14587/) (2026)
- [Prepared for the Worst: A Learning-Based Adversarial Attack for Resilience Analysis of the ICP Algorithm](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05666/) (2024)
- [Sparse Threats, Focused Defense: Criticality-Aware Robust Reinforcement Learning for Safe Autonomous Driving](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.01800/) (2026)
- [Security and Resilience in Autonomous Vehicles: A Proactive Design Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.12408/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Robotic Vehicles (RVs) have gained great popularity over the past few years. Meanwhile, they are also demonstrated to be vulnerable to sensor spoofing attacks. Although a wealth of research works have presented various attacks, some key questions remain unanswered: are these existing works complete enough to cover all the sensor spoofing threats? If not, how many attacks are not explored, and how difficult is it to realize them? This paper answers the above questions by comprehensively systematizing the knowledge of sensor spoofing attacks against RVs. Our contributions are threefold. (1) We identify seven common attack paths in an RV system pipeline. We categorize and assess existing spoofing attacks from the perspectives of spoofer property, operation, victim characteristic and attack goal. Based on this systematization, we identify 4 interesting insights about spoofing attack designs. (2) We propose a novel action flow model to systematically describe robotic function executions and unexplored sensor spoofing threats. With this model, we successfully discover 103 spoofing attack vectors, 26 of which have been verified by prior works, while 77 attacks are never considered. (3) We design two novel attack methodologies to verify the feasibility of newly discovered spoofing attack vectors.