# Let's Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.00881 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.00881/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 2 of its 28 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 28 Apr 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.08020/) (2018)
- [Complexity of Manipulation, Bribery, and Campaign Management in Bucklin and Fallback Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1307.7322/) (2013)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study settings in which agents with incomplete preferences need to make a collective decision. We focus on a process of majority dynamics where issues are addressed one at a time and undecided agents follow the opinion of the majority. We assess the effects of this process on various consensus notions -- such as the Condorcet winner -- and show that in the worst case, myopic adherence to the majority damages existing consensus; yet, simulation experiments indicate that the damage is often mild. We also examine scenarios where the chair of the decision process can control the existence (or the identity) of consensus, by determining the order in which the issues are discussed.