# Model Checking Strategic Abilities in Information-sharing Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.08896 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.08896/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 11 of its 74 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 19 Apr 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 11 of 11)

- [Strategy Logic with Imperfect Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.12592/) (2018)
- [Ceteris Paribus Structure in Logics of Game Forms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1310.6416/) (2013)
- [Decidability results for ATL* with imperfect information and perfect recall](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.12582/) (2018)
- [Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1411.5820/) (2014)
- [Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1707.08736/) (2017)
- [Towards the Verification of Strategic Properties in Multi-Agent Systems with Imperfect Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.13621/) (2021)
- [Reasoning About the Transfer of Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1401.3825/) (2014)
- [Strategic disclosure of opinions on a social network](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.02710/) (2016)
- [Model Checking ATL* on vCGS](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.04350/) (2019)
- [A Hennessy-Milner Theorem for ATL with Imperfect Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.15000/) (2020)
- [Bisimulations for Verifying Strategic Abilities with an Application to the ThreeBallot Voting Protocol](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.13692/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce a subclass of concurrent game structures (CGS) with imperfect information in which agents are endowed with private data-sharing capabilities. Importantly, our CGSs are such that it is still decidable to model-check these CGSs against a relevant fragment of ATL. These systems can be thought as a generalisation of architectures allowing information forks, in the sense that, in the initial states of the system, we allow information forks from agents outside a given set A to agents inside this A. For this reason, together with the fact that the communication in our models underpins a specialised form of broadcast, we call our formalism A-cast systems. To underline, the fragment of ATL for which we show the model-checking problem to be decidable over A-cast is a large and significant one; it expresses coalitions over agents in any subset of the set A. Indeed, as we show, our systems and this ATL fragments can encode security problems that are notoriously hard to express faithfully: terrorist-fraud attacks in identity schemes.