# Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.01773 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.01773/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 4 Apr 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Contracting with a Learning Agent](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.16198/) (2024)
- [ElicitationGPT: Text Elicitation Mechanisms via Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.09363/) (2024)
- [Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules Meet Principal-Agent Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08613/) (2023)
- [Truthfulness of Calibration Measures](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.13979/) (2024)
- [Aligned Textual Scoring Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.06221/) (2025)
- [The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.07671/) (2026)
- [Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.17379/) (2025)
- [Scoring Rules! Statistical and Strategic Alignment for Text Evaluation Metrics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.01423/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider a principal-agent problem where the agent may privately choose to acquire relevant information prior to taking a hidden action. This model generalizes two special cases: a classic moral hazard setting, and a more recently studied problem of incentivizing information acquisition (IA). We show that all of these problems can be reduced to the design of a proper scoring rule. Under a limited liability condition, we consider the special cases separately and then the general problem. We give novel results for the special case of IA, giving a closed form "pointed polyhedral cone" solution for the general multidimensional problem. We also describe a geometric, scoring-rules based solution to the case of the classic contracts problem. Finally, we give an efficient algorithm for the general problem of Contracts with Information Acquisition.