# Strategyproof and Proportional Chore Division for Piecewise Uniform Preferences

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.00456 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.00456/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 1 Apr 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.09306/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Chore division is the problem of fairly dividing some divisible, undesirable bad, such as a set of chores, among a number of players. Each player has their own valuation of the chores, and must be satisfied they did not receive more than their fair share. In this paper, I consider the problem of strategyproof chore division, in which the algorithm must ensure that each player cannot benefit from mis-representing their position. I present an algorithm that performs proportional and strategyproof chore division for any number of players given piecewise uniform valuation functions.