# Equitable Continuous Organizations with Self-Assessed Valuations

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.10644 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.10644/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Mar 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Explainable AI via Learning to Optimize](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.14174/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Organizations are often unable to align the interests of all stakeholders with the financial success of the organization (e.g. due to regulation). However, continuous organizations (COs) introduce a paradigm shift. COs offer immediate liquidity, are permission-less and can align incentives. CO shares are issued continuously in the form of tokens via a smart contract on a blockchain. Token prices are designed to increase as more tokens are minted. When the share supply is low, near-zero prices make it advantageous to buy and hold tokens until interest in the CO increases, enabling a profitable sale. This attribute of COs, known as investment efficiency, is desirable. Yet, it can yield allocative inefficiency via the "holdout problem," i.e. latecomers may find a CO more valuable than early tokenholders, but be unable to attain the same token holdings due to inflated prices. With the aim of increasing overall equity, we introduce a voting mechanism into COs. We show this balances allocative and investment efficiency, and may dissuade speculative trading behaviors, thereby decreasing investment risk.