# Social Choice Around the Block: On the Computational Social Choice of Blockchain

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.07777 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.07777/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 10 of its 70 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Mar 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Consensus in the Age of Blockchains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.03936/) (2017)
- [Do the rich get richer? An empirical analysis of the BitCoin transaction network](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1308.3892/) (2013)
- [Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1507.06183/) (2015)
- [Blockchain Consensus Protocols in the Wild](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1707.01873/) (2017)
- [Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.09437/) (2017)
- [Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.07468/) (2018)
- [The Miner's Dilemma](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1411.7099/) (2014)
- [Byzantine Preferential Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.02720/) (2018)
- [Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.03652/) (2021)
- [Solida: A Blockchain Protocol Based on Reconfigurable Byzantine Consensus](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1612.02916/) (2016)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.04417/) (2023)
- [The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.14402/) (2023)
- [Determining Winners in Elections with Absent Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.07150/) (2023)
- [Swimming with Whales: Analysis of Power Imbalances in Stake-Weighted Governance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.19264/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

One of the most innovative aspects of blockchain technology consists in the introduction of an incentive layer to regulate the behavior of distributed protocols. The designer of a blockchain system faces therefore issues that are akin to those relevant for the design of economic mechanisms, and faces them in a computational setting. From this perspective the present paper argues for the importance of computational social choice in blockchain research. It identifies a few challenges at the interface of the two fields that illustrate the strong potential for cross-fertilization between them.