# Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.12292 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.12292/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 24 Feb 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Blockchain Infrastructure for Intelligent Cyber--Physical--Social Systems:Post-Quantum Security, Interoperability, and Trustworthy Data Economies in the Era of Embodied AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.06895/) (2026)
- [How to Evaluate Behavioral Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.04778/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions than those of the NE and Level-K; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or lower number of parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.
