# A Game-theoretic Understanding of Repeated Explanations in ML Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02659 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.02659/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 9 of its 27 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Feb 2022.

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07874/) (2017)
- ["Why Should I Trust You?": Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.04938/) (2016)
- [Axiomatic Attribution for Deep Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.01365/) (2017)
- [Deep Inside Convolutional Networks: Visualising Image Classification Models and Saliency Maps](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6034/) (2013)
- [Learning Important Features Through Propagating Activation Differences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.02685/) (2017)
- [Fooling LIME and SHAP: Adversarial Attacks on Post hoc Explanation Methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.02508/) (2019)
- [Not Just a Black Box: Learning Important Features Through Propagating Activation Differences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1605.01713/) (2016)
- ["What is Relevant in a Text Document?": An Interpretable Machine Learning Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1612.07843/) (2016)
- [Understanding Convolutional Neural Networks for Text Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.08037/) (2018)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper formally models the strategic repeated interactions between a system, comprising of a machine learning (ML) model and associated explanation method, and an end-user who is seeking a prediction/label and its explanation for a query/input, by means of game theory. In this game, a malicious end-user must strategically decide when to stop querying and attempt to compromise the system, while the system must strategically decide how much information (in the form of noisy explanations) it should share with the end-user and when to stop sharing, all without knowing the type (honest/malicious) of the end-user. This paper formally models this trade-off using a continuous-time stochastic Signaling game framework and characterizes the Markov perfect equilibrium state within such a framework.