# TriLock: IC Protection with Tunable Corruptibility and Resilience to SAT and Removal Attacks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.05943 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.05943/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 16 Jan 2022.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [LockForge: Automating Paper-to-Code for Logic Locking with Multi-Agent Reasoning LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.18531/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Sequential logic locking has been studied over the last decade as a method to protect sequential circuits from reverse engineering. However, most of the existing sequential logic locking techniques are threatened by increasingly more sophisticated SAT-based attacks, efficiently using input queries to a SAT solver to rule out incorrect keys, as well as removal attacks based on structural analysis. In this paper, we propose TriLock, a sequential logic locking method that simultaneously addresses these vulnerabilities. TriLock can achieve high, tunable functional corruptibility while still guaranteeing exponential queries to the SAT solver in a SAT-based attack. Further, it adopts a state re-encoding method to obscure the boundary between the original state registers and those inserted by the locking method, thus making it more difficult to detect and remove the locking-related components.