# Machine Learning Models Disclosure from Trusted Research Environments (TRE), Challenges and Opportunities

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.05628 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.05628/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 15 of its 88 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Nov 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 15 of 15)

- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.07805/) (2020)
- [ML-Leaks: Model and Data Independent Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.01246/) (2018)
- [Threat of Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning in Computer Vision: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1801.00553/) (2018)
- [Med-BERT: pre-trained contextualized embeddings on large-scale structured electronic health records for disease prediction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.12833/) (2020)
- [Machine Learning with Membership Privacy using Adversarial Regularization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.05852/) (2018)
- [Machine Learning Models that Remember Too Much](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1709.07886/) (2017)
- [Node-Level Membership Inference Attacks Against Graph Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.05429/) (2021)
- [Algorithms that Remember: Model Inversion Attacks and Data Protection Law](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.04644/) (2018)
- [Survey: Leakage and Privacy at Inference Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.01614/) (2021)
- [Chiron: Privacy-preserving Machine Learning as a Service](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.05961/) (2018)
- [DeepCare: A Deep Dynamic Memory Model for Predictive Medicine](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.00357/) (2016)
- [Optimization Problems for Machine Learning: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1901.05331/) (2019)
- [Deep Reinforcement Learning for Organ Localization in CT](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.04974/) (2020)
- [Precision medicine as a control problem: Using simulation and deep reinforcement learning to discover adaptive, personalized multi-cytokine therapy for sepsis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.10440/) (2018)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [GRAIMATTER Green Paper: Recommendations for disclosure control of trained Machine Learning (ML) models from Trusted Research Environments (TREs)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.01656/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Artificial intelligence (AI) applications in healthcare and medicine have increased in recent years. To enable access to personal data, Trusted Research environments (TREs) provide safe and secure environments in which researchers can access sensitive personal data and develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning models. However currently few TREs support the use of automated AI-based modelling using Machine Learning. Early attempts have been made in the literature to present and introduce privacy preserving machine learning from the design point of view [1]. However, there exists a gap in the practical decision-making guidance for TREs in handling models disclosure. Specifically, the use of machine learning creates a need to disclose new types of outputs from TREs, such as trained machine learning models. Although TREs have clear policies for the disclosure of statistical outputs, the extent to which trained models can leak personal training data once released is not well understood and guidelines do not exist within TREs for the safe disclosure of these models. In this paper we introduce the challenge of disclosing trained machine learning models from TREs. We first give an overview of machine learning models in general and describe some of their applications in healthcare and medicine. We define the main vulnerabilities of trained machine learning models in general. We also describe the main factors affecting the vulnerabilities of disclosing machine learning models. This paper also provides insights and analyses methods that could be introduced within TREs to mitigate the risk of privacy breaches when disclosing trained models.
