# Institutional Incentives for the Evolution of Committed Cooperation: Ensuring Participation is as Important as Enhancing Compliance

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.13307 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.13307/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 25 Oct 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Trust AI Regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09510/) (2024)
- [Social Diversity Reduces the Complexity and Cost of Fostering Fairness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.10517/) (2022)
- [Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.05373/) (2024)
- [Both eyes open: Vigilant Incentives help Regulatory Markets improve AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.03174/) (2023)
- [Understanding Emergent Behaviours in Multi-Agent Systems with Evolutionary Game Theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.07369/) (2022)
- [Mathematical Modelling of Ethical AI Use in Higher Education: A Coordination Game Framework for Future-Facing Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.27400/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggests that arranging a prior commitment or agreement before an interaction enhances the chance of reaching mutual cooperation. Yet it is not clear what mechanisms can promote the participation in and compliance with such a commitment, especially when the former is costly and deviating from the latter is profitable. Prior work either considers regimented commitments where compensation is assumed enforceable from dishonest committers, or assume implicit commitments from every individual (so they are all in and thus being treated as such). Here we develop a theory of participation and compliance with respect to an explicit prior commitment under institutional incentives where individuals, at first, decide whether or not to join a cooperative agreement to play a one-shot social dilemma game. Using a mathematical model, we determine when participating in a costly commitment and complying with it, is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) when playing against all other possible strategies, and results in high levels of cooperation in the population. We show that, given a sufficient budget for providing incentives, reward of commitment compliant behaviours better promotes cooperation than punishment of non-compliant ones. Moreover, by sparing part of this budget for rewarding those who are willing to participate in a commitment, the overall frequency of cooperation can be significantly enhanced, for both reward and punishment. Finally, we find that, surprisingly, the presence of errors in a participation decision favours evolutionary stability of commitment compliant strategies and higher levels of cooperation.