# Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.09066 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.09066/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 18 Oct 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Harm Ratio: A Novel and Versatile Fairness Criterion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02977/) (2024)
- [Externalities in Chore Division](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.12446/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.