# Sharing FANCI Features: A Privacy Analysis of Feature Extraction for DGA Detection

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.05849 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.05849/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 8 of its 25 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 12 Oct 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Learning Phrase Representations using RNN Encoder-Decoder for Statistical Machine Translation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1406.1078/) (2014)
- [Sequence to Sequence Learning with Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.3215/) (2014)
- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [Hacking Smart Machines with Smarter Ones: How to Extract Meaningful Data from Machine Learning Classifiers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1306.4447/) (2013)
- [Privacy Preserving Machine Learning: Threats and Solutions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.11238/) (2018)
- [eXpose: A Character-Level Convolutional Neural Network with Embeddings For Detecting Malicious URLs, File Paths and Registry Keys](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.08568/) (2017)
- [Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.00791/) (2016)
- [Analyzing the Real-World Applicability of DGA Classifiers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.11103/) (2020)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The goal of Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) detection is to recognize infections with bot malware and is often done with help of Machine Learning approaches that classify non-resolving Domain Name System (DNS) traffic and are trained on possibly sensitive data. In parallel, the rise of privacy research in the Machine Learning world leads to privacy-preserving measures that are tightly coupled with a deep learning model's architecture or training routine, while non deep learning approaches are commonly better suited for the application of privacy-enhancing methods outside the actual classification module. In this work, we aim to measure the privacy capability of the feature extractor of feature-based DGA detector FANCI (Feature-based Automated Nxdomain Classification and Intelligence). Our goal is to assess whether a data-rich adversary can learn an inverse mapping of FANCI's feature extractor and thereby reconstruct domain names from feature vectors. Attack success would pose a privacy threat to sharing FANCI's feature representation, while the opposite would enable this representation to be shared without privacy concerns. Using three real-world data sets, we train a recurrent Machine Learning model on the reconstruction task. Our approaches result in poor reconstruction performance and we attempt to back our findings with a mathematical review of the feature extraction process. We thus reckon that sharing FANCI's feature representation does not constitute a considerable privacy leakage.