# Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08856 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.08856/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 3 of its 45 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 18 Sep 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategyproofness for the Random Assignment Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1401.3675/) (2014)
- [Multi-type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.06836/) (2019)
- [Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07993/) (2017)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.04589/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents their top items, is often identified as an important efficiency criterion and measure of agents' satisfaction. In this paper, we propose a natural and intuitive efficiency property, favoring-eagerness-for-remaining-items (FERI), which requires that each item is allocated to an agent who ranks it highest among remaining items, thereby implying first-choice maximality. Using FERI as a heuristic, we design mechanisms that satisfy ex-post or ex-ante variants of FERI together with combinations of other desirable properties of efficiency (Pareto-efficiency), fairness (strong equal treatment of equals and sd-weak-envy-freeness), and strategyproofness (sd-weak-strategyproofness). We also explore the limits of FERI mechanisms in providing stronger efficiency, fairness, or strategyproofness guarantees through impossibility results.