# Certifiers Make Neural Networks Vulnerable to Availability Attacks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.11299 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.11299/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 34 of its 54 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 25 Aug 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 34)

- [Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6572/) (2014)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [Intriguing properties of neural networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6199/) (2013)
- [Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.04644/) (2016)
- [Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.02918/) (2019)
- [Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.00420/) (2018)
- [BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.06733/) (2017)
- [Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.05526/) (2017)
- [Robustness May Be at Odds with Accuracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.12152/) (2018)
- [Reluplex: An Efficient SMT Solver for Verifying Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.01135/) (2017)
- [Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.12185/) (2018)
- [On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.08347/) (2020)
- [Certified Robustness to Adversarial Examples with Differential Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.03471/) (2018)
- [Efficient Neural Network Robustness Certification with General Activation Functions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1811.00866/) (2018)
- [Label-Consistent Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.02771/) (2019)
- [Safety Verification of Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.06940/) (2016)
- [Deep Continuous Fusion for Multi-Sensor 3D Object Detection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.10992/) (2020)
- [Towards Stable and Efficient Training of Verifiably Robust Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.06316/) (2019)
- [Blind Backdoors in Deep Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.03823/) (2020)
- [Semidefinite relaxations for certifying robustness to adversarial examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1811.01057/) (2018)
- [Dynamic Backdoor Attacks Against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.03675/) (2020)
- [Is Robustness the Cost of Accuracy? -- A Comprehensive Study on the Robustness of 18 Deep Image Classification Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.01688/) (2018)
- [Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.10307/) (2018)
- [A Convex Relaxation Barrier to Tight Robustness Verification of Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.08722/) (2019)
- [Sponge Examples: Energy-Latency Attacks on Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.03463/) (2020)
- [Globally-Robust Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.08452/) (2021)
- [SoK: Certified Robustness for Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.04131/) (2020)
- [Practical Detection of Trojan Neural Networks: Data-Limited and Data-Free Cases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.15802/) (2020)
- [Towards the Science of Security and Privacy in Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.03814/) (2016)
- [Handcrafted Backdoors in Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.04690/) (2021)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Confidential Guardian: Cryptographically Prohibiting the Abuse of Model Abstention](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.23968/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.