# Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.03749 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.03749/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 Aug 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Beyond Majority Voting: LLM Aggregation by Leveraging Higher-Order Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.01499/) (2025)
- [Transferring Annotator- and Instance-dependent Transition Matrix for Learning from Crowds](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.03116/) (2023)
- [Robust Decision Aggregation with Second-order Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.14094/) (2023)
- [Intuitions of Compromise: Utilitarianism vs. Contractualism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.05496/) (2024)
- [Surprisingly Popular Voting for Concentric Rank-Order Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.08367/) (2024)
- [SP-Rank: A Dataset for Ranked Preferences with Secondary Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.05253/) (2025)
- [Multi-agent decision making: A Blackwell's informativeness approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.06028/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. Voters may be "contingent" with different preferences in different states; or predetermined with the same preference in every state. In this setting, even if every voter is a contingent voter, agents voting according to their private information need not result in the adoption of the universally preferred alternative, because the signals can be systematically biased. We present an easy-to-deploy mechanism that elicits and aggregates the private signals from the voters, and outputs the alternative that is favored by the majority. In particular, voters truthfully reporting their signals forms a strong Bayes Nash equilibrium (where no coalition of voters can deviate and receive a better outcome).