# Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game with Hypergame Framework

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.14625 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.14625/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 30 Jul 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07971/) (2022)
- [A Survey on Hypergame Theory: Modelling Misaligned Perceptions and Nested Beliefs for Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.19593/) (2025)
- [Hypergame Theory for Decentralized Resource Allocation in Multi-user Semantic Communications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.17985/) (2024)
- [Targets in Reinforcement Learning to solve Stackelberg Security Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.17132/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to investigate both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. In fact, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can become HNE. Moreover, we discuss the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether players have the ability to keep their profits under the influence of some misinformation.