# Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.11503 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.11503/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 6 of its 93 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Jun 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1401.5577/) (2014)
- [Game Theory with Translucent Players](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1310.6438/) (2013)
- [Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1410.3363/) (2014)
- [Perfect Prediction in Normal Form: Superrational Thinking Extended to Non-Symmetric Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.05723/) (2017)
- [A Model for Partial Kantian Cooperation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.01921/) (2016)
- [Example of a finite game with no Berge equilibria at all](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.05821/) (2018)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [On multiagent online problems with predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.12486/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and problematic extension to general normal form games. We give such a generalization based on concept of program equilibria, and point out that that a practically relevant generalization may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria that are special cases Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.