# Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.03457 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.03457/

## Key facts

- Cited by 17 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 7 Jun 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 17 of 17)

- [Proportionally Representative Clustering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.13917/) (2023)
- [Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.01566/) (2021)
- [Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.14798/) (2022)
- [Strategic Facility Location with Clients that Minimize Total Waiting Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.14016/) (2022)
- [Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.04340/) (2023)
- [Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.03467/) (2022)
- [Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.09137/) (2022)
- [Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03114/) (2024)
- [Facility Location Games Beyond Single-Peakedness: the Entrance Fee Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.11282/) (2022)
- [Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.18908/) (2024)
- [MAC Advice for Facility Location Mechanism Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.12181/) (2024)
- [Large Language Models for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.09533/) (2025)
- [Learning Recommender Mechanisms for Bayesian Stochastic Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22979/) (2025)
- [Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.10460/) (2025)
- [Prediction-Augmented Mechanism Design for Weighted Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.06509/) (2025)
- [Compatibility of Max and Sum Objectives for Committee Selection and k-Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.17063/) (2025)
- [Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.03818/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.