# A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.11292 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.11292/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 21 May 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [From Intelligent Agents to Trustworthy Human-Centred Multiagent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.02260/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders. However, many existing approaches consider restricted settings (e.g., only one rider per vehicle or a common origin for all riders). Moreover, naive applications of standard approaches, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or greedy mechanisms, cannot achieve a polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism. To address this, we formulate a general ridesharing problem and apply mechanism design to develop a novel mechanism which satisfies all four properties and whose social cost is within 8.6% of the optimal on average.