# Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10064 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.10064/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 14 of its 36 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 May 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 14 of 14)

- [Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14122/) (2020)
- [EFX Exists for Three Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.05119/) (2020)
- [Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvement and Generalization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.00222/) (2017)
- [Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.07447/) (2020)
- [An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Shares](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.00029/) (2019)
- [The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.04910/) (2019)
- [On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1605.04026/) (2016)
- [Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.08165/) (2019)
- [Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.08129/) (2019)
- [Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.06940/) (2016)
- [Equilibria in Sequential Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.09444/) (2017)
- [On Fair Division of Indivisible Items](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.06232/) (2018)
- [Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6546/) (2013)
- [Welfare of Sequential Allocation Mechanisms for Indivisible Goods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1511.08280/) (2015)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Virtual Agent Economies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.10147/) (2025)
- [Best of Both Distortion Worlds](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.19453/) (2023)
- [Stable Matching with Ties: Approximation Ratios and Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.03270/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her k most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the value of k needed to achieve envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without the fairness requirements.