# Dynamic Proportional Rankings

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.08043 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.08043/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 17 May 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Online Approval Committee Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.06830/) (2022)
- [DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.07356/) (2021)
- [Representative Ranking for Deliberation in the Public Sphere](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18962/) (2025)
- [Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guarantees](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.35331/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ranking when alternatives (i.e., questions) -- not necessarily from the top of the ranking -- get selected sequentially. We propose generalizations of well-known aggregation rules to this setting and study their monotonicity and proportionality properties. We also evaluate the performance of these rules experimentally, using realistic probabilistic assumptions on the selection procedure.