# Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.02699 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.02699/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 6 May 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.00843/) (2023)
- [Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12107/) (2023)
- [Schelling Games with Continuous Types](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.06819/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the possibility of agents being tolerant towards other agents, even if they are not of the same type. In particular, we consider an ordering of the types, and make the realistic assumption that the agents are in principle more tolerant towards agents of types that are closer to their own according to the ordering. Based on this, we study the strategic games induced when the agents aim to maximize their utility, for a variety of tolerance levels. We provide a collection of results about the existence of equilibria, and their quality in terms of social welfare.