# Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.15075 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.15075/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 10 of its 53 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 30 Apr 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Participatory Budgeting: Models and Approaches](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.00606/) (2020)
- [Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.01747/) (2019)
- [The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.03474/) (2016)
- [Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.06527/) (2017)
- [Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.00457/) (2019)
- [Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.08226/) (2017)
- [Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.07997/) (2020)
- [District-Fair Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.06115/) (2021)
- [Participatory Budgeting with Project Groups](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.05213/) (2020)
- [Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affirmative Action is beyond NP](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.10087/) (2020)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where citizens may give additional money to projects they want to see funded. We introduce a formal framework for this kind of PB with donations. Our framework also allows for diversity constraints, meaning that each project belongs to one or more types, and there are lower and upper bounds on the number of projects of the same type that can be funded. We propose three general classes of methods for aggregating the citizens' preferences in the presence of donations and analyze their axiomatic properties. Furthermore, we investigate the computational complexity of determining the outcome of a PB process with donations and of finding a citizen's optimal donation strategy.